Louisiana Supreme Court
FORUM
FOR EQUALITY PAC, A REGISTERED LOUISIANA
POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE, LOUISIANA LOG CABIN
REPUBLICANS, AN UNINCORPORATED LOUISIANA ASSOCIATION,
LAURENCE E. BEST, JEANNE M. LEBLANC, GERALD W.
THIBODEAUX, WILLIAM A. SCHULTZ, AND JULIE A. JACOBS
VERSUS
THE HONORABLE W. FOX MCKEITHEN, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF STATE OF LOUISIANA ONLY, AND
NOT INDIVIDUALLY, AND CITY OF NEW ORLEANS
ON APPEAL FROM THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
FOR THE PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE
HONORABLE WILLIAM A. MORVANT, JUDGE KNOLL, Justice
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court's declaration of unconstitutionality and find La. Const. art. XII, §15 constitutional. We further dissolve the stay.
REVERSED.
CALOGERO, C.J., concurs and assigns reasons.
1/19/05 SUPREME COURT
OF LOUISIANA
NO. 04-CA-2477
c/w
NO. 04-CA-2523
FORUM FOR EQUALITY PAC, A REGISTERED LOUISIANA
POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE, LOUISIANA LOG CABIN
REPUBLICANS, AN UNINCORPORATED LOUISIANA ASSOCIATION,
LAURENCE E. BEST, JEANNE M. LEBLANC, GERALD W.
THIBODEAUX, WILLIAM A. SCHULTZ, AND JULIE A. JACOBS
VERSUS
THE HONORABLE W. FOX MCKEITHEN, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF STATE OF LOUISIANA ONLY, AND
NOT INDIVIDUALLY, AND CITY OF NEW ORLEANS
ON APPEAL FROM THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
FOR THE PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE
HONORABLE WILLIAM A. MORVANT, JUDGE KNOLL, Justice
This case concerns a judgment of the district court declaring the constitutional
amendment titled “Defense of Marriage,” unconstitutional in violation of Article
XIII, § 1(B) of the 1974 Constitution of Louisiana. For the following
reasons we reverse, finding the district court erred by interpreting the single
object requirement narrowly rather than employing a germane approach for a
single object with multiple parts. We find each provision of the amendment
is germane to the single object of defense of marriage and constitutes an
element of the plan advanced to achieve this object.1 Forum for Equality PAC
v. Honorable W. Fox McKeithen, 04-2477 ( La. ), __ So.2d __.2
LEE HARGRAVE, supra
Act 926 titles the constitutional amendment, “Defense of Marriage”26 and sets forth its purpose as “to enact Article XII, Section 15, relative to marriage; to require that marriage in the state shall consist only of the union of one man and one woman; to provide that the legal incidents of marriage shall be conferred only upon such union; to prohibit the validation or recognition of the legal status of any union of unmarried individuals; to prohibit the recognition of a marriage contracted in another jurisdiction which is not the union of one man and one woman.” Given the clear and unambiguous language of the title adopted by the Legislature,27 one could logically conclude the object of the amendment is “defense of marriage.” However, in further search of the intended object of this amendment and in an abundance of caution, we also look to the committee meeting discussions held by each house of the Legislature. The minutes of the House Civil Law and Procedure Committee indicated a concern that “the Civil Code of law followed in Louisiana” would not be adequate protection for marriage in this state without a constitutional amendment because “ Louisiana 's Civil Code would yield to provisions of the state constitution that might be found in conflict with it.” See 2004 Regular Session, Minutes of Meeting of House Civil Law and Procedure Committee, May 11, 2004, p. 8 (Representative Gallot and Professor Trahan speaking).
Moreover, the minutes of the Senate Committeeon Judiciary, Section A28 also reflect this need for additional protection of our civil law tradition of marriage, As evident from the legislative history of Act 926, this title was adopted very early on in this Act's history, as the Act was prefiled on March 1, 2004, and the proposed title was amended to reflect “defense of marriage” rather than “definition of marriage” on May 12, 2004. The House Bill was enrolled as Act No. 926 on July 12, 2004. According to the Legislative Calendar, the title, “Defense of Marriage,” was adopted by the House on May 18, 2004, and by the Senate on June 9, 2004. See supra, section Legislative History of Act 926.
These Senate committee minutes discuss the duplicate bill to House Bill 61, Senate Bill 26 noting that the “intent was to put this in the Louisiana Constitution so that the legal issues of law cannot be challenged” because, although the protection of is arguably provided for in our Civil Code, “[t]he constitution has a far greater protection ... than that of a statute.” See Senate Committee on Judiciary, Section A, Minutes of Meeting, May 4, 2004 , p. 6 (Senators Lentini and Hainkel speaking). Further, testimony was received that noted a potential “threat under Louisiana Constitution Article 1, sec 2, our due process clause,” exists, which “place[s] our traditional statutes at risk.” Id. (Professor Katherine Spaht speaking). Although the amendment could not protect Louisiana's civil tradition of from all attacks, specifically the United States Supreme Court's declaration of unconstitutionality, the testimony did note the amendment would provide additional protection to. Id. at p. 11 (Senators Holden and Hainkel speaking). The central theme running throughout these committee meetings is the need to protect or defend our civil tradition of through the adoption of a constitutional amendment, which has as its sole object the defense and protection of our civil tradition of.29
Thus, as evident from its title as proposed by the Legislature and the discussions in committee meetings, the object of this constitutional amendment is “defense of,” i.e., to defend this state's civil tradition of. Notably, this is where the district court erred in that it is apparent from the court's. We note both bills, House Bill 61 and its duplicate Senate Bill 166, were opposed in the committees. Opponents testified to the lack of a real need for such an amendment given our present statutory law, noted the discriminatory motivations for the amendment, and debunked as a scare tactic the theory that the amendment protects, family, procreation, and children, spec if ically stating “in talking about protecting children and that we could better put our time towards trying to find resolutions to the fact that we have one out of four children in this state living in poverty, an education system that is going to take a lot of work and that we have a lot of children that are uninsured, not to mention the high divorce rate.” See Senate Minutes, pp. 9-11 (spec if ically James Fischer speaking); see also, House Minutes, p. 9-12. Essentially, the opponents advocate: “[w]e need to work towards things that unite us as citizens and not something like this that separates us as citizens of this state.” See Senate Minutes, p. 11 (James Fischer speaking).
The district court
agreed in part with the plaintiffs in that the court found the amendment consisted
of two objects and essentially two plans:(1) to constitutionally prohibit
same-sex as consistent with our present civil law; and (2) to address civil
unions or contracts between persons of the same sex. Thus, the district court
found the provisions of the amendment were not germane to a single plan or
object.
On the other hand, the State and the intervenors assert all the provisions
of the amendment are essential to the main object of the amendment and set
forth a single plan to adequately defend traditional from all contemporary
threats. According to the intervenors, the provisions of sentence one defend
marriage against redefinition. The provisions of sentence two defend against
lawless acts by public officials and decisions by our courts interpreting
our existing constitution. The provisions of sentence three defend against
other alternative, legally recognized arrangements that would rival, while
sentence four defends against the recognition of unions in violation of the
above from other states. Thus, the State and the intervenors conclude the
Legislature's sole objective to defend could not have been adequately accomplished
without the inclusion of these provisions. As discussed above, the object
of this amendment is to defend. Unquestionably, any adequate defense of would
have to be premised upon the understanding that our civil tradition of necessarily
entails both the concept of and the civil effects and legal incidents flowing
directly from as provided by our civil law and our Civil Code. See, e.g.,
Civ. Code. arts. 86-159 (relative to). With this understanding, we examine
each provision of the amendment.
Sentence one obviously defines marriage: “Marriage in the state of Louisiana
shall consist only of the union of one man and one woman.” Sentence two refers
to the effects and legal incidents of marriage: “No official or court of the
state of Louisiana shall construe this constitution or any state law to require
that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any member
of a union other than the union of one man and one woman.” Continuing the
focus on the effects and incidents of marriage, sentence three refers to the
legal status of marriage: “A legal status identical or substantially similar
to that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized.”
Concluding, sentence four refers to recognition 30 of out-of-state marriage:
“No official or court of the state of Louisiana shall recognize any marriage
contracted in any other jurisdiction which is not the union of one man and
one woman.”
Such an examination
reveals the amendment contains a single plan to defend our civil tradition
of marriage. In effect, the amendment provides the only contract or legal
instrument whereby the state is mandated to bestow all or substantially all
the rights, civil effects, and legal incidents of marriage upon the parties
in recognition of the legal status created or established by said contract
or instrument is the contract of marrriage between one man and one woman.
We find that each provision constitutes an element of this plan. Specifically,
the provisions of sentence one seek to preserve the concept of marriage in
its definition, while the provisions of sentences two, three, and four seek
to protect and reserve only to marriage the legal incidents and civil effects
that necessarily flow to the couple from the state by operation of law based
solely on the recognition of their legal status as husband and wife, i.e.,
their legal union.31 Moreover, each provision is germane to the object of
“defense of marriage” and “constitute[s] a consistent and workable whole on
the general topic embraced in that part which is amended,” i.e., the “defense
of marriage.”
As noted by the State in its brief to this court, this constitutional amendment
would not impair any property rights, which are not “identical or substantially
similar to” the package of unique property rights necessary to marriage.
For example, the amendment would not prohibit an unmarried couple(either a
same-sex couple or opposite-sex couple) from contracting to be co-owners of
certain specific property they purchase together or from contracting with
each other to designate each other his/her agent for making critical life
or medical decisions for him/her in cases of medical emergencies where he/she
might not be conscious or contracting as to one's power of attorney; nor does
this amendment prohibit an unmarried couple from making wills leaving their
estates to one another. See as reference Brief of Defendant-Appellant W. Fox
McKeithen on the Merits, Forum for Equality PAC v. Honorable W. Fox McKeithen,
04-2477, 04-2523 ( La. __), __ So.2d __. 31
Accordingly, we find
the constitutional amendment does not violate the “single object” requirement
of La. Const. art. XIII, § 1(B), and therefore, we reverse the district
court's declaration of unconstitutionality.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court's declaration of
unconstitutionality and find La. Const. art. XII, § 15 constitutional.
We further dissolve the stay.
REVERSED.
HONORABLE WILLIAM A. MORVANT, JUDGE
CALOGERO, Chief Justice, concurs and assigns reasons.
(In part):
I find the state's position more plausible. I agree with the majority that the single object provision only requires that an amendment to the constitution constitute a single plan, and that every subsection of the amendment need only be germane to the amendment's main purpose or object. I wish to reiterate the majority's observations, at note 31, concerning the impact of this decision on property and contract rights of unmarried couples. Nothing in the majority opinion would prohibit an unmarried couple from contracting to be 1co-owners of property, from designating each other agents authorized to make critical end of life decisions, or from leaving property to each other through wills. The majority opinion does not disturb or impair the fundamental contract and property rights possessed by all individuals, be they homosexual or heterosexual, married or unmarried.
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